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Abstract 
 
Causality affects our perception of time; events that appear as causally related are 
perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is known as 
temporal binding.  One potential explanation of this effect is that causality slows an internal clock  that is used in interval estimation. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined participants’ perceived duration of a range of intervals between a causal 
action and an effect, or between two unrelated events. If (apparent) causality slows the 
internal clock, then plotting perceived duration against actual duration should reveal a 
shallower slope in the causality condition (a relative compression of perceived time).  
This pattern was found. We then examined an interesting corollary: that a slower rate 
during causal sequences would result in reduced temporal acuity. This is what we 
found: Duration discrimination thresholds were higher for causal compared to non-
causal sequences.  These results are compatible with a clock-slowing account of 
temporal binding.  Implications for sensory recalibration accounts of binding are 
discussed.  
 
Keywords: temporal binding; causal binding; internal clocks; sensory recalibration; time 
perception 
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The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal 
sequences 
 
1. Introduction 
When a cause (e.g., an action) triggers an outcome, the action is perceived to 
occur later and its outcome earlier than two unrelated events (Buehner & Humphreys, 
2009; Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002); and the temporal interval separating causally 
related events is perceived as shorter (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Nolden, Haering & 
Kiesel, 2012).  This is known as temporal binding.  One explanation of the binding effect 
is based on Bayesian inference (Buehner, 2012; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002): The 
brain learns that events that appear as causally related are typically contiguous in time, 
i.e. the temporal gap between them is zero.  When an observer judges a temporal gap, 
the observer combines sensory information about the duration of the gap, with the 
information about the most likely gap (based on prior experience) which tends to zero. 
When combined, the result is an under-estimation of the actual duration.   
Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, (2002) discovered temporal binding using the Libet 
clock method (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983), in which participants watch a fast-
moving clock hand that completes a rotation every 2560 ms.  On one set of baseline 
trials, participants made a voluntary keypress and were asked to report the clock hand 
position at the time of keypress. On another set of baseline trials they heard a tone and 
were asked to report the clock hand position when it occurred.  On experimental trials, 
participants made a voluntary key-press that triggered a tone 250ms later and were 
asked to report either the clock hand position at the time of the keypress or the time of 
the tone that followed.  Judgment error was the difference between the actual and the 
reported event (keypress or tone) time.  Judgment errors from experimental trials 
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revealed systematic shifts relative to single-event baseline trials: key presses were 
subjectively delayed, while their outcomes were perceived to have happened earlier. 
Put simply, actions and their outcomes appear to attract each other in subjective time. 
Since the original Haggard et al. (2002) study, many labs have replicated and 
extended the temporal binding effect, suggesting, amongst other things, that varying the 
duration and predictability of the action-outcome interval affects the extent of temporal 
binding, such that the extent of binding increases for longer intervals (Ruess, 
Tomaschke & Kiesel, 2018).  A different approach to binding has been pursued by 
Buehner and Humphreys (2009), who used a stimulus anticipation method (SAM). In 
this study, participants were trained to synchronise their key presses to two tones, t1 
and t2. In a causal condition a key press coinciding with t1 triggered the outcome tone, 
t2. In a non-causal condition participants were still told to press the key to coincide with 
t1, but in this condition the key press was not causally related to the outcome tone t2; 
instead, t2 was programmed to follow t1, regardless of whether or not the key was 
pressed.  In other words, in the causal condition, participants were the cause of t2, but 
in the non-causal condition, the computer was the common cause of both t1 and t2.  
Buehner & Humphreys found early anticipation (indexed by objectively earlier key 
presses) of the outcome tone, t2, in causal, relative to non-causal conditions. This study 
is notable in demonstrating that intentional action and the ability to predict the 
outcome via association on their own are not sufficient for temporal binding. Instead, it 
is necessary that action and outcome are causally related for binding to occur. The role 
of causality in binding is further supported by evidence that an outcome triggered by a 
non-intentional mechanical device also results in binding (Buehner, 2012): In this 
preparation, participants pressed a key (self-causal condition) or watched a robot press 
the same key (machine-causal condition) to produce a subsequent target LED flash; in a 
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baseline condition, participants watched a signal LED flash followed by the target flash.  
The key-press  target interval in the causal conditions was identical to the signal-
target interval in the baseline condition.  In all conditions, participants had to anticipate 
the target flash by attempting to press a response key simultaneously with it.  In line 
with the causal binding hypothesis, Buehner (2012) found earlier awareness (as 
indexed by the key-press timings) of the target flash in both the self-causal as well as 
the mechanical-causal condition, relative to baseline.  Taken together, these results 
indicate that awareness of causality is necessary and sufficient to produce temporal 
binding, and intentional motor action is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
If the perceived timing of events is changed by causal relations then it follows 
that the perceived gap between events should also change.  It does.  Studies find that a 
causal interval is perceived as shorter in time than a non-causal interval, using a variety 
of methods: interval (magnitude) estimation, in which participants make verbal 
estimates of the interval (Cravo, Haddad, Claessens & Baldo, 2013; Engbert et al., 2008; 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Wenke & Haggard, 2009); 
temporal reproduction, where participants hold down a key for the duration of the 
experienced interval (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009); and the method of constant stimuli, 
where a range of variable duration comparison intervals are compared to fixed duration 
reference intervals (Nolden, Haering & Kiesel, 2012). Thus, binding manifests not only as 
shifts in event perception, but also as a direct shortening of the experienced time 
interval.  
 
1.1. Theories of temporal binding 
One account of temporal binding implicates the human motor system. A common 
variant of this approach involves forward models of motor control (Wolpert & 
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Ghahramani, 2000), which consider processes dedicated to voluntary action. According to this view temporal binding arises from the perceptual system’s effort to match 
sensory feedback to a strongly predicted signal, in line with efficient action-outcome 
learning (Haggard et al., 2002) and sense of agency (Moore & Obhi, 2012). A variant of 
this account explains binding as emerging from sensory recalibration (Eagleman & 
Holcombe, 2002; Parsons, Novich & Eagleman, 2013). For example, when performing 
finger clicks, the visual, auditory, and tactile information arrives at our brains with 
different latencies. Yet, our brain compensates for these latencies by realigning the 
sensory streams to ensure a unitary percept. Eagleman and Holcombe argue that 
because causal actions usually produce outcomes immediately, the perceptual-motor 
system realigns input streams to bring action and outcome closer together in time, in an 
effort to restore unity of perception (cf. the Bayesian Inference account referred to at 
the beginning of this article). Note that both perspectives only account for binding when 
the motor system is engaged in the task. Buehner’s  result of causal binding 
following mechanical (robot) action suggests that Bayesian adaptation of event 
perception operates according to more general principles, namely when the observer is 
aware of a causal relation between two events. 
A different theoretical approach suggests that binding might arise due to changes 
in time perception (Wenke & Haggard, 2009; Fereday & Buehner, 2017). Because there 
is no dedicated sense modality for time, temporal information is gleaned from, and 
affected by, various factors: For example, top-down processes, such as paying greater 
attention to time and increased arousal, both subjectively expand temporal intervals 
(Droit-Volet, Fayolle, Lamotte, & Gil, 2013; Tse, Intriligator, Rivest & Cavanagh, 2004); 
bottom-up processes such as the perceptual organization of a stimulus set affect 
temporal judgments (filled intervals are judged as longer than unfilled: Wearden, Norton, 
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Martin & Montford-Bebb, 2007); and modality differences, such that auditory stimuli are 
judged longer than visual stimuli (Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri & Percival, 1998). Common 
explanations for these temporal distortions typically refer to internal clock (or 
pacemaker-accumulator) models (Gibbon, Church & Meck, 1984). These models 
represent the neural accumulation during a to-be-timed interval with discrete pulses. 
Consider an example: when a to-be-timed interval begins, a switch closes (Lc), allowing 
pulses to flow from a pacemaker to an accumulator. The pulses are emitted at rate r. 
When the interval ends, the switch opens (Lo), thereby preventing further pulses from 
being accumulated. Perceived duration is a function of the number of pulses in the 
accumulator, such that for any real-time interval, more accumulated pulses lead to a 
longer perceived duration. Thus, one way that internal clock models can explain 
temporal distortions is via differences in rate r. For example, arousal (such as exercise, 
or an emotional response, such as fear) increases r (Stetson, Fiesta & Eagleman, 2007), 
leading to subjectively longer intervals than in control conditions. Another way in which 
internal clock models can account for alterations to subjective time is via switch 
latencies, such that the switch to begin timing (Lc) is activated later in an experimental 
than a control condition, leading to shorter estimates in the former. 
The signature of a difference in clock rate is a systematically increasing 
difference between perceived vs physical interval duration as the interval duration 
increases.  Consider a concrete example:  Let’s imagine that Alice and Bob are listening to the s, but due to prior exercise, Bob has higher arousal than Alice.  )f Alice’s internal clock registers  pulses during the s, Bob’s clock might register  in the 
same time.  If Alice and Bob listed to a 20s and s tone, then Alice’s clock would register  and  pulses, while Bob’s would register  and :  The difference between Alice’s and Bob’s subjectively elapsed time would increase as the to-be-timed 
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interval increases.  Formally, this is assessed by regressing perceived and physical 
durations and measuring the steepness of the slope: the slower the clock, the shallower 
the slope.  One example of pacemaker rate differences can be found in a study by 
Wearden et al. (1998), who found a steeper slope for auditory compared to visual 
stimuli: The auditory – visual judgment difference increased as a function of duration. 
Other studies, such as those that compare filled to unfilled intervals (Wearden et al., 
2007) also find evidence of pacemaker rate differences, as revealed by the same 
regression procedure. The advantage of conducting regression analyses is that, while 
different slope coefficients implicate pacemaker rate changes, a difference in intercept 
coefficients implies different switch latencies between conditions. Thus, regressing 
subjective over objective durations is an efficient means of disentangling the 
contribution of switch latency from pacemaker rate differences.  
 
1.2. Evidence for slower pacemaker in temporal binding 
Can a slower pacemaker rate explain the contraction of time in temporal 
binding?  In other words, if Alice presses a key to produce a tone 500ms later, or merely 
listens to two tones separated by 500ms, would her pacemaker rate be slower in the 
former compared to the latter? There is only limited evidence pertaining to this 
question. Wenke and Haggard (2009) had participants estimate the duration of the 
interval between two events: in a voluntary condition, a key press triggered an outcome tone after a delay; in an involuntary condition, participants’ fingers were passively 
moved by a servomotor to press the key, followed by an outcome tone after the same 
delay. Wenke and Haggard found shorter estimates of intervals triggered by voluntary 
causal actions, relative to intervals following involuntary actions – the typical binding 
effect.  Importantly, Wenke and Haggard embedded a temporal discrimination task into 
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the trials: participants received two successive electric shocks to the index and middle 
fingers respectively. The interval between the shocks varied according to a staircase 
procedure. Participants were asked to judge whether the shocks were simultaneous or 
successive. The objective of the temporal discrimination task was to probe for clock 
slowing in voluntary intervals. A slower pacemaker rate would result in larger inter-
pulse intervals, thereby increasing the difficulty of making simultaneity judgments, and 
hence increasing the temporal discrimination threshold. Wenke and Haggard found just 
this, with higher thresholds for shocks occurring early in the interval in voluntary trials, 
and attributed this finding to a slower clock early in voluntary intervals.  However, 
while intervals in voluntary trials were judged as shorter than intervals from 
involuntary trials, there was no slope effect: The underestimation of voluntary 
compared to involuntary intervals remained constant as interval size increased, 
contrary to what one would expect from a slowed pacemaker.  We therefore have to be 
careful to interpret these results as evidence for causality-induced clock-slowing, 
especially since Tomassini, Gori, Baud-Bovy, Sandini & Morrone (2014) have 
subsequently demonstrated that action preparation alone leads to effector-specific 
temporal compression: Participants had to make simultaneity judgments of tactile 
stimulation delivered to their hands, similarly to Wenke and Haggard.  Crucially, in Tomassini et al.’s preparation, stimulation was delivered either to a hand involved in a 
simple action, or to a stationary hand, and unlike in Wenke & Haggard, the action 
triggered no further consequence.  Nonetheless, Tomassini et al. found higher 
simultaneity thresholds for stimulation delivered to the moving hand immediately 
before and after motion onset, relative to stimulation delivered to the stationary hand, 
or to the moving hand after the motion was completed.  Motion onset thus leads to 
effector-specific, transient temporal compression.  Wenke and (aggard’s threshold 
Running head: The role of time perception in temporal binding 
10 
 
results could thus be entirely driven by such transient temporal compression, which 
would also explain why they did not obtain a slope effect for interval judgments.  Why 
would there not have been causality-induced slowing of the pacemaker though? A 
review of Wenke & (aggard’s method reveals that while they contrasted voluntary 
against involuntary movement, the causal relationship remained constant: Both 
voluntary and involuntary finger movements caused the subsequent tone. It is thus 
entirely possible that the results they obtained do in fact not reflect temporal binding at 
all, but are simply caused by the transient temporal compression following motor 
preparation. 
A study that provides some evidence of clock slowing in temporal binding is 
Humphreys and Buehner (2009), who asked participants to provide verbal estimates of 
causal and non-causal intervals for a range of durations from 150ms to 4000ms. A 
regression of estimates onto actual interval durations found shallower slopes for causal, 
compared to non-causal intervals: in other words, the amount of under-estimation of 
causal compared to non-causal intervals grew as a function of objective duration, as 
predicted by a slower pacemaker rate r.  This evidence is only tentative, however, 
because verbal estimates of duration frequently violate the assumption of mean 
accuracy (Wearden and Lejeune, 2008), which refers to the requirement that mean 
estimates should vary linearly with actual duration (i.e. duration estimates should 
increase in line with objective interval durations).  A common finding though, is that data conforms to Vierordt’s law, whereby short durations are judged as longer, and 
longer durations are judged as shorter, than actual durations. This would lead to 
shallower slopes than those derived from other methods (e.g., the method of constant 
stimuli; see description of Nolden et al., 2012, below). A further reason to be sceptical of 
verbal estimation is that Matthews (2011) found differences in slopes between 
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conditions where a pacemaker increase/decrease cannot have occurred. Verbal 
estimation, therefore, is not sufficiently reliable a method with which to investigate 
differences in slope coefficients.   
 
 
1.3. The current study 
One reason why interval estimation may violate the assumptions of internal 
clock models is because duration judgments are based on an internal reference 
stimulus, which is prone to distortion. A better option is to use discrimination methods, 
which present the reference stimulus during the experiment. Nolden et al. (2012) 
replicated the binding effect using the method of constant stimuli.  Participants judged 
whether a series of comparison durations were shorter or longer than a fixed reference 
interval. For causal and non-causal conditions, the authors estimated the point of 
subjective equality (PSE), which refers to the duration of the comparison interval that is 
perceived as the same (50% of the time its perceived as longer, 50% of the time its 
perceived as shorter) as the reference interval. Their results revealed shorter PSEs in 
causal versus non-causal conditions, for both reference intervals tested (250 and 600 
ms). However, there were too few reference durations employed to obtain a reliable 
estimate of clock speed using the regression method. Therefore, in the present study we 
adopted a psychophysical procedure similar to that of Nolden et al., and combined it 
with the regression method of previous research (e.g., Wearden et al., 1998). We 
regressed perceived intervals (causal and non-causal) onto actual durations to 
determine whether there would be reliable differences in slope, as predicted by a 
slowing of r.  
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In addition to pacemaker rate in temporal binding, we were also interested in the 
impact of a slower clock, i.e., the corollary that temporal resolution is necessarily 
impaired if the pacemaker operates at a slower rate (cf. Stetson et al., 2007, and Wenke 
& Haggard, 2009). Specifically, if the contraction of time in temporal binding reflects a 
decrease in the rate of a specific clock system, then the impaired temporal resolution 
that follows generates an interesting prediction: The threshold required to temporally 
discriminate causal intervals should be higher than for non-causal intervals. 
Importantly, this would not be the case if binding were rooted in shifts in the events 
that delineate the interval (or by a difference in switch latencies). Only a subjective 
distortion of time during the interval could explain temporal discrimination differences 
between causal and non-causal intervals.  
We report four experiments that investigate clock slowing in temporal binding. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, there were two conditions, causal and non-causal, and 
participants experienced two intervals per trial in each: on causal trials, one of the 
intervals was between a key press and visual flash, while on non-causal trials, one of the 
intervals was delineated by two visual flashes. In both conditions a single temporally 
extended stimulus served as the comparison interval. Participants judged whether the 
single stimulus interval was shorter or longer than the key press-flash interval (causal 
trials) or the flash-flash interval (non-causal trials). Based on responses from a range of 
comparison (extended stimuli) interval durations we computed the PSE as a measure of 
perceived interval duration. We expected shorter causal versus non-causal PSEs, due to 
temporal binding. Furthermore, a regression of PSEs onto actual duration would reveal 
slope differences if pacemaker rates vary between causal and non-causal intervals. 
In Experiments 3 and 4, we corroborated the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, 
that revealed shallower slopes in causal conditions. Participants discriminated between 
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two causal intervals in one condition, and two non-causal intervals in another. In both 
conditions, participants judged whether one interval was shorter or longer than the 
other (Experiment 3) or judged which interval was the longest (Experiment 4). We 
computed the just-noticeable-difference (JND) as a measure of temporal discrimination, 
which is the minimum duration necessary to discriminate the duration of two intervals.  
If temporal causal binding is effected via a slower clock rate, then JNDs should be higher 
for causal intervals, due to the poorer temporal resolution.  
The experiments in this paper operationalised the causal vs. non-causal 
distinction by comparing action-event to event-event intervals (e.g. key-press  flash 
vs. flash – flash). The bulk of previous research in temporal binding was concerned with 
a distinction between active causal actions and passively induced non-causal 
involuntary actions (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002; Wohlschläger et al., 2003; Wenke & 
Haggard, 2009), to isolate the active, intentional aspect of causal actions from the mere 
motor component. However, subsequent research has found that a) the active, 
intentional aspect of the action on its own is insufficient to result in binding – the action 
has to be causal (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009); b) passively induced actions that cause 
a subsequent outcome still result in binding, despite the absence of intentional action 
planning (Buehner, 2015); c) observed causal action-outcome intervals lead to 
comparable temporal binding as self-executed causal action-outcome intervals (Poonian 
& Cunnington, 2013); d) cause-effect intervals where the cause is a mechanical action 
rather than a human motor action, are subject to temporal binding, albeit reduced 
compared to motor-action causality (Buehner, 2012; Shiloh, White & Buehner, 2017). As 
mentioned earlier, causality is necessary and sufficient to produce temporal binding, 
and intentional motor action, while possibly exerting a boost on temporal binding, is 
neither necessary nor sufficient.  We decided on implementing the causal vs non-causal 
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distinction by comparing temporal intervals between a motor action (key press) that 
triggers an outcome to intervals between two unrelated events, because this is by far 
the most efficient and economical way to study temporal binding.  We discuss potential 
limitations of this approach in the General Discussion. 
2. Experiment 1  
We conducted the following experiment in order to (1) determine whether clock 
slowing underpins temporal binding; (2) explore the involvement of switch latencies; 
and (3) determine whether timing sensitivity is constant or variable, in cause-effect 
intervals. To these ends, we conducted a variant of Wearden et al. (1998). In their study, 
interval estimates were regressed onto actual durations and the resultant coefficients 
analysed to disentangle the contribution of pacemaker rate and switch latencies. In the 
current experiment though, we replaced interval estimation with a discrimination 
procedure. In causal and noncausal conditions participants experienced reference and 
comparison intervals. The reference interval was delineated by two events: a key press 
and visual flash (causal trials) or two visual flashes (noncausal trials). The comparison 
interval was a single temporally extended visual stimulus in both conditions. The 
sequence of reference and comparison intervals was manipulated with a between-
subjects factor: either the reference interval first and comparison, or the reverse. In 
both levels of the between-subjects variable, participants compared the duration of the 
comparison to the reference interval. The PSEs were then estimated and regressed onto 
reference durations to analyse the coefficients.  If temporal causal binding is effected via 
the slowing of an internal clock, we should find shallower slopes for causal versus 
noncausal conditions in addition to lower PSEs. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
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Thirty-five students of Cardiff University (33 female, 2 male, Mage  = 19.76, age 
range: 18 - 29) participated in Experiment 1. Participants received course credit or £5 
payment.  
 
2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was implemented in Psychopy (Peirce, 2007) on cathode ray 
tube (CRT) monitors with resolution of 1280 x 1024 and refresh rate of 120 Hz 
connected to Apple Mac Minis. Both conditions (causal, noncausal) featured two 
intervals. A reference interval was marked by two events: a key press and the 
appearance of a white square in causal trials, and two white squares in noncausal trials 
(all white squares were 200 pixels2 and displayed for 50 ms). The second comparison 
interval was a single visual event (a black circle; radius 70 pixels). The duration of 
reference interval was fixed for a block, while the duration of the comparison interval 
varied from trial to trial, as determined by a staircase procedure. A white fixation cross 
(60 pixels2) was displayed throughout each trial. All stimuli were presented centrally on 
the screen. Figure 1 illustrates the trial structure. 
 
2.1.3. Design and procedure 
We employed two factors: Trial Type (causal and noncausal) and Reference 
Duration (5 durations, 200ms steps: 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000 ms). The dependent variable was participants’ PSE as derived from a series of trials controlled by a staircase 
procedure.  Participants completed 5 blocks of causal and noncausal trials (one block 
per Reference Duration x Trial Type combination).  The number of trials within a block 
varied due to the staircase procedure employed – each block ended when minimum 
reversal and trial number criteria were satisfied as explained below , with each block 
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comprising around 30 trials. This resulted in around 300 trials total, with an additional 
12 practice trials, prior to the experiment, for causal and noncausal blocks.  
 
 
Figure 1. Representative trial structure of Experiments 1 and 2. Participants were 
presented with two intervals in each condition. Half of the participants experienced the 
following: the duration of the first interval was fixed for a block, while the second was 
variable. In causal trials, a key press triggered a visual flash after a delay (interval 1), 
followed by an extended temporal event (black circle: interval 2). In noncausal trials, 
two visual flashes delineated interval 1, followed by the black circle (interval 2). 
Participants were asked whether the second interval was shorter or longer than the 
first. The remaining half were presented with the variable interval first, then the 
reference interval. They were then asked whether the first interval was shorter or 
longer than the second.  
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Causal trials began with the display of a fixation cross on screen. Participants 
were told to press a key at a time of their choosing, which triggered a visual flash (white 
square as per above) after a fixed duration (200, 400, 600, 800, 1000 ms). After an ISI of 
1000 ms, the black circle was displayed for a duration that was varied from trial to trial 
by a staircase algorithm. Participants were then asked whether the duration of the black 
circle was shorter or longer than the key press - flash interval. After responding, the 
screen blanked for a random duration (1500 - 2300 ms) before the display of the 
fixation cross signalled the next trial. 
Noncausal trials followed a similar procedure. The trial began with the display of 
a fixation cross, presented for a random duration (750 - 1250 ms). A visual flash (white 
square) marked the start of the first interval, followed by another flash of a white 
square after a fixed interval (200, 400, 600, 800, 1000 ms). After an ISI of 1000 ms, the 
second interval (black circle) was displayed for a duration (variable from trial to trial). 
Participants were then asked whether the second (variable) interval was shorter or 
longer than the first (fixed) interval. Participants responded by pressing the S or L keys, 
respectively. The screen then blanked for a random duration (1500 - 2300 ms) before 
the fixation cross signalled the beginning of the next trial.  
The experiment began with either a causal or noncausal block (first completing 
practice trials: see below), thereafter alternating between them. The duration of the 
fixed interval was selected at random from one of the five reference duration intervals, 
and remained fixed for each block. The variable interval was controlled by a staircase 
procedure, using a Kesten stochastic approximation algorithm (Kesten, 1958; 
Treutwein, 1995). This allows for fast and reliable convergence onto the point where 
participants are 50% correct.  We used two randomly interleaved staircases, one 
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ascending one descending, each with target convergence thresholds of 0.5, with each 
block ending after a minimum of 4 reversals and 15 trials per staircase. The first trials of 
each staircase began with durations of 0.5 and 1.5 times the fixed duration, i.e., for a 
fixed interval of 400 ms, the variable interval would begin at durations of 200 and 600 
ms for each respective staircase. Additionally, the first trial of each staircase was classed 
as a control trial, with the first and second trials of each staircase set to the same 
duration, regardless of response. This was to ensure that incorrect or mistaken 
responses early in each block did not adversely affect the direction of each staircase, 
e.g., a mistaken response would alter the direction of the staircase and reduce the 
likelihood of convergence within the scheduled number of trials. 
Participants first completed practice blocks (causal and noncausal), which 
contained a fixed reference duration of 650 ms. These were shorter than the main 
experimental blocks and were programmed to end after a minimum of two reversals 
and six trials per staircase. Participants then alternated between causal and noncausal 
blocks of the main experiment. Throughout the experiment, participants were given a 2-
minute break between blocks. The study was conducted across two sessions, with one 
session per day. Participants began with a causal block in session one and noncausal in 
session two. 
We reversed the order of fixed (reference) and variable intervals in a between-
subjects manner. For half of participants, the comparison interval was presented first, 
and the reference interval second. For the other half, the reverse applied (we 
operationalised this as the factor Interval Order [reference first, variable first]). The 
fixation cross disappeared during the ISI period, so that participants would know when 
to press the key to trigger the flash. Participants were still asked whether the 
comparison interval was shorter or longer than the reference interval. 
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2.2. Results 
PSE analysis1. Prior to statistical analysis, we removed the first (control) trial of 
each staircase, before fitting cumulative Gaussian curves, following the generalized 
linear model (GLM) procedure in R (Knoblauch & Maloney, 2012). We then calculated 
the PSEs and screened the data for normality. Participants whose PSEs deviated from 
the mean by more than 3 standard deviations (in any Trial Type x Reference Duration 
combination), were not entered into the analysis. This led to ten participants being 
removed2. Figure 2 shows that causal PSEs are shorter than non-causal for all levels of 
Reference Duration. Figure 2 also shows a linear relationship between PSEs and actual 
durations, indicating that participants successfully distinguished between reference 
durations. ANOVA supports these observations, with a significant effect of Trial Type, 
F(1, 24) = 23.31, p < .001, partial 2 = .49, Reference Duration, F(4, 94) = 53.13, p < .001, 
partial 2 = .69, and a Trial Type x Reference Duration interaction, F(4, 96) = 3.98, p < 
.01, partial 2 = .14. This also supports the observation that the causal vs non-causal 
difference increased with Reference Duration. Post hoc comparisons find significant 
differences between all levels of Trial Type (200 ms: p < .05; 400, 800 ms: p < .01; 600, 
1000 ms: p < .001). Whilst we did not find an effect of Interval Order, F(1, 24) = .03, p = 
.86, partial 2 < .01, or a Trial Type x Interval Order interaction, F(1, 24) = 2.68, p = .12, 
partial 2 = .10, the Reference Duration x Interval Order interaction was significant, F(4, 
96) = 4.16, p < .01, partial 2 = .15 (See Online Supplement and Figures S3 and S5 for 
details). The Trial Type x Reference Duration x Interval Order interaction was not 
significant, however, F(4, 96) = .59, p = .67, partial 2 = .02.  
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Regression analyses3. To ascertain whether switch latencies or pacemaker 
slowing can explain the data, we conducted further analyses. Perceived durations were 
regressed onto actual durations for each participant. We then performed mixed 
ANOVAs on the resultant intercept and slope coefficients, with Trial Type as a within-
subjects factor and Interval Order (2 levels [reference first, variable first]) as a between-
subjects factor. The results are as follows: 
Intercepts. The analysis showed no significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 22) = 2.02, 
p = .17, partial 2 = .08, nor a Trial Type x Interval Order interaction, F(1, 22) = 1.13, p = 
.30, partial 2 = .05. However, we did find a significant effect of Interval Order, F(1, 22) = 
32.57, p < .001, partial 2 = .60 (See Online Supplement and Figure S1 for details).  
Slopes. The analysis showed a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 22) = 10.10, p < 
.01, partial 2 = .32, which crucially, supports our hypothesis of a slower clock in causal 
conditions. The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Interval Order, F(1, 22) = 12.92, p 
< .01, partial 2 = .37, but no Trial Type x Interval Order interaction, F(1, 22) = 2.64, p = 
.12, partial 2 = .12 (See Online Supplement and Figure S2 for details).  
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Figure 2. Results of Experiments 1. Causal PSEs are shorter than Non-Causal, thus 
replicating the temporal binding effect. The bold line represents the veridical responses; 
this shows that causal PSEs are underestimated across all Standard Durations. Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
In the current experiment we replicated the temporal binding effect using a 
temporal discrimination procedure. Unsurprisingly, we found that PSEs increased 
linearly with reference duration in both conditions, indicating that participants 
successfully distinguished between durations. Also, PSEs were lower than objective 
reference durations in causal conditions only; noncausal PSEs were largely veridical. 
More importantly though, we found lower PSEs in causal versus noncausal conditions, 
in line with temporal binding.  
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However, our main goal was to identify whether temporal binding implicates 
changes to pacemaker speed or switch latency.  To this end, we calculated regression 
coefficients on a participant-by-participant basis, and then compared mean slope and 
intercept values between conditions.   Slope differences would be evidence for different 
pacemaker speeds; specifically, a shallower slope for causal compared to non-causal 
intervals would indicate that the relative underestimation of causal intervals is driven 
by a slower pacemaker during causal episodes.  Intercept differences, on the other hand, 
would be evidence for delayed closing of the switch; specifically, a smaller intercept for 
causal compared to non-causal intervals would indicate that relative underestimation of 
causal intervals is driven by a delayed closing of the switch at the start and/or the end 
of causal episodes.   
We found no evidence for a switch-latency effect, finding no difference between 
causal and noncausal intercepts. Instead, the results of the slope analysis finds 
shallower slopes in causal than noncausal conditions. This supports a clock slowing 
account of temporal binding. However, to substantiate the current findings, we 
conducted a further experiment with more Reference Durations.  
 
3. Experiment 2  
The second experiment was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1.. We 
increased the number of reference durations from five to ten. We maintained the same 
range of durations but increased the resolution, using steps of 100 ms (i.e., 100, 200, 
300, 400 . . . 1000 ms). In other respects, the procedure was identical.  
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
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Thirty-four students of Cardiff University (29 female, 5 male, Mage = 20, age 
range: 18 - 25) participated in Experiment 2 (we applied the same exclusionary criteria 
as in Experiment 1: see footnote 1). Participants received course credit or £10 payment.  
3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
This remained the same as Experiment 1.   
3.1.3. Design and procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that we used 
more reference durations (100, 200, 300, 400 . . . 1000 ms). We also manipulated the 
order of reference and comparison intervals along the lines of Experiment 1, using a 
between-subjects variable. Participants completed around 300 trials total, with an 
additional 12 practice trials, prior to the experiment, for causal and noncausal blocks. 
 
3.2 Results 
PSE analysis. We followed the same curve fitting and exclusion procedures as in 
the previous experiments. This resulted in the removal of 9 participants. Figure 3 shows 
that all PSEs increase linearly with reference durations, implying that participants 
distinguished between reference durations. Importantly, causal durations are perceived 
as shorter than noncausal, in line with the results of the previous experiment. Statistical 
analyses support these observations, with ANOVA showing a significant effect of Trial 
Type, F(1,22) =  26.63, p < .001, partial 2 = .55, Reference Duration, F(9,198) = 50.67, p 
< .001, partial 2 = .70, and a Trial Type x Reference Duration interaction, F(9, 198) = 
3.34, p < .01 ,partial 2 = .13. This interaction supports our observation that the causal-
noncausal difference increases linearly with Reference Duration. Post hoc tests find 
significant differences between Trial Type for most levels of Reference Duration (100, 
300, 400, 600, 800, 900, 1000 ms: p < .01; 200, 500 ms: p < .001; 700 ms: p = .11). There 
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was no effect of Interval Order, F(1,22) = .04, p = .84, partial 2 < .01, nor a Trial Type x 
Interval Order interaction, F(1,22) = 2.03, p = .17, partial 2 = .09. However, we did find 
significant interactions between Reference Duration x Interval Order, F(9,198) = 5.00, p 
< .001, partial 2 = .19, and Trial Type x Reference Duration x Interval Order, F(9,198) = 
1.91, p = .05, partial 2 = .08. Illustrations and interpretations for these interactions are 
provided in the Online Supplement and Figures S4 and S6.     
Regression analyses. As in the analyses for Experiments 1 and 2, we conducted 
individual regressions to further probe switch latency and clock slowing effects. We 
then performed mixed ANOVAs on the intercept and slope coefficients, with Trial Type 
as a within-subjects factor and Interval Order as a between-subjects factor. The results 
are as follows:  
Intercepts. The analysis showed no significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 24) = 1.54, 
p = .23, partial 2 = .06, nor a Trial Type x Interval Order interaction, F(1, 24) = 1.64, p = 
.21, partial 2 = .06. However, we did find a significant effect of Interval Order, F(1, 24) = 
11.14, p < .01, partial 2 = .32 (See Online Supplement and Figure S1 for details).  
Slopes. The analysis showed a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 24) = 18.84, p < 
.001, partial 2 = .44, and Interval Order, F(1, 24) = 13.49, p < .01, partial 2 = .36. The 
former is line with Experiment 1, and supports our clock-slowing account of temporal 
binding (See Online Supplement and Figure S2 for details). We found no Trial Type x 
Interval Order interaction, F(1, 24) = .22, p = .64, partial 2 = .01.  
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Figure 3. Results of Experiments 2. Causal PSEs are shorter than Noncausal, 
complementing the results of Experiment 1. The bold line represents the veridical 
responses; this shows that causal and noncausal PSEs are underestimated across all 
Standard Durations. Error bars show standard error. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The results of the current experiment replicate those of Experiment 1. PSEs increased 
linearly in causal and noncausal conditions, which indicates that participants 
discriminated reference durations. Interestingly, PSEs were underestimated relative to 
veridical in causal and noncausal conditions. This is in contrast to the previous 
experiment, where noncausal PSEs were veridical. The crucial finding, however, is that 
causal PSEs were lower than noncausal, thus supporting the temporal binding effect. 
 In order to determine whether binding is effected via switch latencies or clock 
slowing, we examined the regression coefficients using the same procedure as 
Experiment 1. We found no evidence for differences in switch latencies, with no 
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significant difference between causal and noncausal intercepts. Importantly, we found a 
significant difference between slopes, further supporting a slower clock in temporal 
binding.    
4. Experiment 3 
The two experiments reported thus far have provided evidence in support of the 
clock-slowing hypothesis.  A corollary of a slower clock during causal episodes is that 
temporal discrimination should be impaired, relative to non-causal intervals (see Figure 
4). We thus tested the prediction that a slower clock rate in causal intervals would affect 
temporal acuity. Specifically, when discriminating two causal intervals (in one 
condition) and two noncausal intervals (in another) fewer pulses in causal intervals 
should lead to poorer temporal resolution, which in turn would result in poorer 
discrimination acuity.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic showing hypothesised internal clock pulses in causal and noncausal 
intervals (Experiments 3 and 4). The pulse rate within conditions is stable, but varies 
between conditions: Fewer pulses in causal intervals, as effected by a slower pacemaker, 
would result in poorer temporal discrimination when comparing two causal intervals to 
one another relative to comparing two noncausal intervals.  
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To investigate this prediction, we conducted a temporal discrimination task, 
which measured discrimination thresholds in causal and noncausal scenarios. In causal 
trials participants had to discriminate between two intervals delineated by a key press 
and visual flash. In noncausal trials, participants were asked to discriminate two 
intervals delineated by two visual flashes. The duration of the first interval in both 
conditions was fixed for a block, while the second varied from trial to trial. Participants 
were asked to judge whether the second (variable) interval was shorter or longer in 
duration than the first (fixed) interval. We then computed the discrimination threshold 
(JND) for a range of intervals. Larger JNDs in causal trials would be compatible with a 
slower pacemaker rate during causal intervals, relative to noncausal.  
Note that PSEs for comparing causal to causal and non-causal to non-causal 
intervals should not differ.  In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, where participants 
compared causal vs non-causal intervals to a temporally extended reference duration, 
Experiments 3 and 4 deployed comparisons of like intervals.  Differences in pacemaker 
rate would therefore only influence temporal acuity, but not subjective equality.  
Consider comparing the weights of two rocks, once with high-precision scales and once 
with low-precision scales.  The minimum difference in weight that is required to 
identify one rock as heavier than the other will be smaller in the former compared to 
the latter case.  At the same, though, accuracy (but not precision) of identifying two 
rocks of equal weight would be unaffected by scale precision. 
 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Fourteen students of Cardiff University (13 female, Mage = 23.43, age range: 21 - 
42) participated in exchange for course credit or £4 payment. 
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4.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was implemented in Psychopy (Pierce, 2007) on CRT monitors, 
with resolution of 1280 x 1024 and refresh rate of 120 Hz connected to Apple Mac 
computers. In both conditions (causal and noncausal) participants were presented with 
two intervals. In causal trials both intervals were between a key press and a visual flash 
(white square against a grey background, 200 pixels2), while two visual flashes marked 
the intervals in noncausal trials. All visual flash stimuli were 50 ms in duration. In causal 
and noncausal trials the first interval was of a fixed duration, while the second always 
varied in duration from trial to trial according to a staircase procedure. A fixation cross 
(60 pixels2) appeared on screen before each interval and was displayed until the 
interval finished. All stimuli were presented centrally on screen.   
 
4.1.3. Design and procedure 
Trial Type (causal, noncausal) and Reference Duration (250, 450, 650 and 850 
ms) varied as within-subjects factors.  The dependent variable was derived from the participants’ discrimination judgments. We operationalized discrimination as the just 
noticeable difference (JND), which is half of the difference between 0.75 and 0.25 
responding probability from a fitted psychometric function. Participants alternated 
between causal and noncausal experimental blocks, with one block of each reference 
duration, comprising roughly 50 trials per block (two interleaved staircases, each 
ending after a minimum of 25 trials and 4 reversals. See specifics below). 
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Figure 5. Trial structure of Experiment 3. Participants were presented with two 
intervals in each condition. The duration of the first interval was fixed for a block, while 
the second was variable. In causal trials, a key press triggered a visual flash after an 
interval; in noncausal trials, two visual flashes delineated an interval. Participants were 
asked whether the second interval was shorter or longer than the first.  
 
Figure 5 shows the trial structure of the experiment. Causal trials began with the 
display of a fixation cross. Participants then made a voluntary key press, which 
triggered a visual flash after a fixed interval (250, 450, 650 or 850 ms). During this 
interval the fixation cross remained on screen, but disappeared immediately following 
the flash. Participants then experienced an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms 
before the fixation cross was again displayed. As in the first interval, participants made 
a voluntary key press that triggered a visual flash after a variable interval (length 
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determined by the staircase procedure). The fixation cross again disappeared 
immediately following the flash. Participants were then asked whether the second 
(variable) interval was shorter or longer than the first (fixed) interval by pressing the S 
or L keys, respectively. The screen then blanked for a random duration between 1500 - 
2300 ms before the next trial began. 
Noncausal trials followed a similar procedure. Trials began with the display of a 
fixation cross, for a random time (750 - 1250 ms). A visual flash then marked the 
beginning of the interval, followed by another visual flash after a fixed duration (250, 
450, 650 or 850 ms). After an ISI of 1000 ms the fixation again appeared (random 
duration: 750 - 1250 ms,) before the second interval began, which was delineated by 
two visual flashes. The fixation cross remained on screen throughout each interval and 
disappeared for the ISI period. As in causal trials, participants were asked to press the S 
or L keys if they perceived the second interval to be shorter or longer than the first.  
The duration of the fixed interval was selected at random from one of the four 
Reference Duration intervals, and remained fixed for each block. The variable interval 
was controlled by a staircase procedure, using the same Kesten stochastic algorithm as 
in Experiments 1 - 4 (Kesten, 1958; Treutwein, 1995). However, the convergence 
thresholds of each staircase were 0.25 and 0.75, respectively, and each block ended 
after a minimum of 4 reversals and 25 trials per staircase. In other respects, the 
procedure remained the same as the previous experiments. 
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Figure 6. Results of Experiments 3 (upper row: A & B) and 4 (lower row: C & D). (Left 
panels: A & C): JNDs are higher in causal conditions than noncausal, showing that 
participants found causal intervals harder to discriminate in both experiments. (Right 
panels: B & D): In Experiment 3, causal PSEs are overestimated, with respect to the 
veridical responses (shown by a lighter/shorter dashed line). Error bars represent 
standard error.  
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Participants first completed practice blocks, with a fixed reference duration of 
600 ms. These were shorter than the main experimental blocks and were programmed 
to end after a minimum of 2 reversals and 6 trials per staircase. Participants began with 
either causal or noncausal blocks, the order of which was randomly determined. 
Participants completed one block of each (causal or noncausal), before moving on to the 
main experimental blocks. Throughout the experiment, participants were given a 2-
minute break between blocks.    
4.2. Results 
JND analysis. We first applied the exclusion criteria from Experiments 1 and 2, 
but no participants merited removal. Control trials (trial 1 of each staircase) were 
removed before fitting psychometric functions (cumulative Gaussian). Figure 6(A) 
shows mean JNDs for Trial Type, plotted against Reference Duration. JNDs are clearly 
higher for the causal condition across all reference durations, indicating that 
participants were less precise in discriminating causal intervals compared to noncausal. 
A 2 x 4 (Trial Type [causal, noncausal] x Reference Duration [250, 450, 650,850]) 
ANOVA corroborated these impressions. We observed a main effect of Trial Type, 
F(1,13) = 25.06, p < .001, partial 2 = .67, and Reference Duration, F(3,39) = 3.79, p < 
.05, partial 2 = .23. However, the Trial Type X Reference Duration interaction was not 
significant, F(3,39) = .42, p = .74, partial 2 = .03.  
PSE analysis.  Because this experiment presented participants with two matched 
intervals (i.e. two causal intervals in a row), one would of course expect PSEs to be 
veridical.  However, the reference intervals were always presented before the variable 
duration intervals, creating scope for order effects. For example, a common finding in 
time perception is the temporal order effect (TOE), where the second interval is judged 
as longer than the first, when the intervals are presented in series (Schab & Crowder, 
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1988). Although, to our knowledge, no studies have examined the effect of stimulus 
order on discrimination judgments (as opposed to duration judgments), we 
nevertheless wanted to ascertain that order effects are not driving our results. To 
examine whether order effects were present, we inspected causal and noncausal PSEs; 
because the experiment involved comparing like-for-like (i.e.,causal v causal intervals, 
noncausal versus noncausal intervals), the PSEs ought to be (a) veridical (i.e., in line 
with actual durations); and (b) should not differ between Trial Type conditions. Figure 
6 (B) shows the PSEs for each level of Reference Duration. Visual inspection shows a 
near perfect linear relation between noncausal PSEs and actual stimulus duration. In 
contrast, causal PSEs appear consistently longer than veridical for all reference 
durations, suggesting a TOE (the second interval required a longer real-time duration in 
order to be judged as equal in duration to the first). In other words, the second interval 
was actually perceived as shorter than the first.  This observation is corroborated by a 2 
x 4 within subjects ANOVA with factors Trial Type and Reference Duration: In addition 
to the main effect of Reference Duration, F(3,39) = 182.91, p < .001, partial 2 = .93, the 
main effect of Trial Type was also significant, F(1,13) =   7.80, p = .015, partial 2 = .38.  
The interaction was not significant, F(3,39) =   1.67, p = .209, partial 2= .11. 
4.3. Discussion 
As would expected from the Weber-Fechner Law, JNDs scaled with reference 
duration.  More importantly and in line with the hypothesis of a slower pacemaker in 
temporal binding, we also found that causal JNDs were significantly larger than 
noncausal, for all reference durations tested.  An unexpected finding, though, concerns 
the PSEs. While PSEs in noncausal conditions were generally veridical, causal PSEs were 
larger. This indicates that the second (comparison) causal interval was perceived as 
shorter than the first (reference) causal interval. In other words, our data exhibit an 
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order effect, which might (at least, in part) have contributed to our JND results. To avoid 
conflating order effects with those induced by causality, and to provide more 
compelling evidence for causality-induced discrimination differences, we conducted one 
further experiment.  
 
5. Experiment 4 
This experiment differed to the previous one only in terms of the sequence of 
reference and comparison intervals in each trial. We randomised the temporal position 
of the reference and comparison intervals and asked participants to judge which 
interval was the longest. Additionally, we used only two reference interval durations. In 
other respects, the procedure remained the same as in Experiment 3.  
 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1. Participants 
Six students of Cardiff University (5 female, 1 male, Mage = 26.83, age range: 22 - 
33) participated in exchange for £2 payment or course credit.  
 
5.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
This remained the same as the previous experiment.  
 
5.1.3. Design and procedure 
This remained the same as the previous experiment with a few exceptions. We 
randomised the sequential position of the reference and variable intervals, so that the 
reference interval could be presented either first or second in a particular trial. Also, we 
used two standard durations (450, 650 ms) instead of four. Participants were asked 
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which interval was longest, and responded by pressing either the left or right arrow key 
to correspond to the first or second interval, respectively. In all other respects the 
procedure remained the same as above.  
 
5.2. Results  
JND analysis. We followed the exclusion criteria used in the previous 
experiments in this paper, with no participants meriting removal. As before, we 
removed the first trial of each staircase before fitting cumulative Gaussian functions. 
Mean JNDs are shown in Figure 6 (C). Consistent with the previous results, JNDs are 
higher in causal than noncausal conditions. ANOVA supports these results, with a main 
effect of Trial Type, F(1,5) = 11.19, p < .05, partial 2 = .69. In contrast to the previous 
experiment we found no effect of Reference Duration, F(1,5) = .02, p = .90, partial 2 < 
.01. The Trial Type x Reference Duration interaction again was not significant, F(1,5) = 
.12, p = .74, partial 2 = .02.  
PSE analysis. A final and important observation concerns order effects. Given that 
the intervals in the trial sequence were random (i.e., fixed duration intervals could 
either be first or second in a particular trial), we expected PSEs of both conditions to be 
veridical. Indeed, this is what we find, as Figure 6 (D) shows.  The main effect of 
Duration was significant, F(1,5) =   67.36, p < .001, partial 2 = .93, but the main effect of 
Trial Type was not, F(1,5) =    0.02, p = .881, partial 2  < .01. Thus, the finding that JNDs 
in causal trials are higher than non-causal, cannot be attributed merely to order effects, 
and instead, is likely due to poorer temporal resolution, as would be expected from a 
slower pacemaker rate.  
 
5.3. Discussion 
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The results of the present experiment complement those of Experiment 3. We 
found that causal JNDs were significantly larger than non-causal. We are reassured to 
find that randomising the order of reference and comparison intervals eliminated the 
order effects on PSE we observed for causal intervals Experiment 3, whereby the 
comparison interval was perceived as shorter than the reference.  Instead, PSEs were 
near veridical and identical in both the causal and non-causal condition.  This assures us 
that the key result of threshold differences differences found in Experiment 3 (and 
replicated in Experiment 4) could not have been driven by the artificial distortions 
associated with order effects of reference vs. variable intervals.   
Can the results be explained by differences in switch latencies? If the start/stop 
latencies are related to the interval to-be-timed, such that the latencies are a fixed ratio 
of the interval, then both intervals would be perceived as equal. In other words, 
comparing like-for-like intervals would not result in the discrimination thresholds 
evidenced in these experiments. This is the case even if the start/stop latencies are 
different between causal and non-causal conditions, but fixed within conditions. Our 
results are therefore only compatible with a change in time perception during the 
interval. In sum then, our results are only compatible with a slower clock rate in causal 
intervals. 
 
6. General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to determine whether temporal binding is effected via 
the slowing of an internal clock.  Specifically, we asked whether distortions in time 
perception that are typically found in binding preparations are driven by changes in 
how temporal intervals are perceived. 
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In Experiments 1 and 2 participants compared causal and non-causal intervals to  
temporally extended reference stimuli.  We estimated the point of subjective equality 
(PSEs) for a range of durations and conducted regression analyses to determine slope 
and intercept coefficients. In these experiments we found significantly shallower slopes 
in causal than non-causal intervals, a clear signature of a slower pacemaker in cause-
effect intervals. This mirrors the results of Humphreys and Buehner (2009), who also 
found shallower slopes for cause-effect intervals using interval estimation. Our results 
are also comparable with Nolden et al. (2012), who found shorter PSEs for causal, 
relative to non-causal intervals using the method of constant stimuli. Thus, the results 
from Experiments 1 and 2 appear to be robust and in line with earlier work in this area.  
Importantly, the deployment of a range of intervals afforded calculation of regression 
coefficients, which in turn enabled us to look for evidence pertaining to changes in 
pacemaker speed and switch latency.  Overall, the results from Experiments 1and 2 
support a slower clock hypothesis of temporal binding.  
In Experiments 3 and 4 we tested the hypothesis that a slower pacemaker during 
causal episodes would lead to poorer temporal discrimination. Participants were 
presented either with a sequence of two causal or two non-causal intervals and had to 
indicate which one was shorter or longer.  A difference in pacemaker speed between the 
conditions should translate into different discrimination thresholds (just noticeable 
difference: JNDs).  In line with our prediction, we found that discrimination thresholds 
were indeed higher in causal conditions. Furthermore, these results were robust against 
mere order effects (i.e. the order of reference and comparison intervals in each trial). 
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 thus corroborate and extend those of Experiments 1 
and 2, supporting the hypothesis that intervals delineated by causally related events are 
timed by a slower clock than intervals delineated by unrelated events.  
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6.1. Pacemaker slowing or drifts in attention? 
It is important to be clear about what the slope coefficient represents. A 
difference in slopes between causal and non-causal conditions suggests a different 
number of pulses accumulated between conditions. Given an absence of an intercept 
difference (which rules out differences in switch latencies), there are two possibilities: 
one is that there is indeed, a slower pacemaker, while the other is that pacemaker rate is 
constant, but that there are drifts in attention. The latter suggests that pulses are missed 
due to non-focal attention, such that certain pulses are not accumulated. Both accounts 
would explain the shallower slopes found in Experiments 1 and 2. We shall explore each 
option in turn.  
Why would the pacemaker rate decrease in cause-effect intervals? One 
explanation is that clock rate is linked with arousal. For instance, the (qualitatively) 
higher predictability associated with causal inference (Sloman, 2005) might result in 
less arousal during cause-effect intervals.  The link between arousal and pacemaker 
speed is well established (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2016; Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Mella, 
Conty, & Pouthas, 2011). A corollary of this explanation is that clock speed is modulated 
by cause-effect contingency: if an action always produces a certain outcome with 100% 
contingency, then causal predictability would be higher than in less contingent 
preparations. Therefore, it might follow that clock rate decreases as the causal strength 
between two events increases.  One way to test this would be to examine PSE and slope 
coefficients for different levels of cause-effect contingency. Conversely, replicating 
Experiments 3 and 4 with varying contingency levels might also produce graded 
differences in JNDs. Specifically, if clock speed is modulated by cause-effect contingency 
then JNDs ought to decrease as contingency increases. One caveat is necessary here 
though: Mere contingency and predictability are insufficient in themselves to affect 
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clock speed, because non-causal trial events are equally predictable. It is predictability 
engendered by causality, rather than mere association, that we posit as an explanation 
for clock slowing (Buehner, 2012).   
 
6.2. Where is attention allocated in temporal binding? 
An alternative possibility to clock slowing is that pacemaker rates remain the 
same in causal and non-causal conditions, but instead, an attentional drift in the former 
results in fewer pulses accumulated. How might this be achieved? One solution is that 
more attention is focused on the outcome in causal than non-causal trials, perhaps to 
confirm that an action did indeed produce the predicted outcome. A simple test of this 
hypothesis would be to measure the subjective duration of the outcome; more attention 
would result in a longer perceived outcome durations in causal, compared to non-causal 
trials.  Related to this idea Makwana and Srinivasan (2017) reported that outcomes that 
were intended by the participants appeared to last subjectively longer than unintended 
outcomes.  Empirically, a systematic drift in attention could also explain the results of 
Experiments 3 and 4, because fewer clock pulses, overall, would accumulate during 
causal, than non-causal intervals.  
How might we square these time perception approaches with event perception 
accounts (e.g., Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002)? One possibility is that changes to interval 
perception influence the perceived time (of occurrence) of events, such that a slower 
clock between cause and effect would result in the outcome being perceived sooner 
(and/or the cause being perceived later). In other words, interval timing and event 
perception might be intertwined, such that pacemaker speed influences the perceived 
time of occurrence of events. It is important to point out here that this could only be 
possible if changes in pacemaker speed are specific to the causal interval, rather than 
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implicating all of temporal perception. Time of occurrence judgments are always made 
with reference to some other stimulus (e.g. in many temporal binding preparations, 
participants report the time of their action or its outcome with reference to a fast 
moving clock hand, cf. Haggard et al., 2002). For a pacemaker account to be able to 
accommodate shifts in event perception requires that the cause-effect, but not the 
cause-reference event interval is shortened. In other words, if both intervals were timed 
by the same pacemaker, both events marking the end of the interval (i.e. the effect and 
the reference event) would be shifted by the same absolute amount, and thus the 
difference between, say effect and reference stimulus would remain constant between 
causal and non-causal preparations.  On the other hand, if pacemaker slowing is specific 
to the cause-effect interval, the cause-reference event interval would not be affected, 
which would then result in a perceptual shift such that the effect is perceived earlier 
with reference to the other event (compared to non-causal preparations).  We review 
evidence pertaining to this problem in the next section. 
Alternatively, perceived shifts in event perception and a contraction of time in 
cause-effect intervals might be rooted in two separate processes; causality might 
independently affect clock speed and the perceived time of events delineating intervals. 
In other words, time perception might not affect event timing, but instead, the two are 
distinct processes. Put differently, causality might be the underlying driver for both 
phenomena, but each is brought about by a different mechanism, each of which is 
affected by the presence of a causal relation. Either way, the key point is that changes in 
time perception and perceived event shifts need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. 
 
6.3. General or specific clock slowing? 
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The results of the current study complement those of recent work from our lab 
(Fereday and Buehner, 2017), which has addressed the question of whether clock 
slowing is a general process or unique to the cause-effect interval.  In a similar vein to 
Wenke and Haggard (2009), we used a dual-task paradigm whereby participants either 
judged the duration of an interval, or a stimulus embedded at different points within the 
trial. The intervals were random in duration and were delineated by two events: in 
causal trials, a key press triggered an outcome, and in involuntary trials the 
disappearance of a visual stimulus was followed by an outcome. Additionally, we 
scheduled an embedded stimulus to occur before or during the interval, or not at all. We 
hypothesised that if clock slowing is a general process, its effects would also generalise 
to embedded events that occur during, but not before, the interval; events embedded 
into causal intervals would also be judged as shorter than those that occur in non-causal 
intervals. Naturally, temporal binding should also elicit shorter estimates for causal 
versus non-causal intervals. In four experiments that factorially varied the modality of 
embedded events and outcomes (auditory or visual), we found that causal intervals 
were perceived as shorter than non-causal for all locations of the embedded event (thus 
replicating the well established binding effect). However, we found no difference 
between events embedded into causal, from those embedded into non-causal trial 
intervals. We concluded that internal clock slowing is not a general process, but might 
instead be unique to cause-effect intervals, such that the rate of a pacemaker timing 
cause-effect intervals is slower than that tracking the time of other concurrent events. 
The results of the work reported here now allow us to conclude that these specific 
changes to interval perception were indeed driven by a slowing of pacemaker speed 
during causal episodes. 
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6.4. Does causality or intentional action modulate clock speed? 
The literature on temporal binding is divided between the causal and the 
intentional stance. The latter perspective is unique to the human motor system.  
According to intentional binding theorists, awareness of voluntary actions and 
awareness of their sensory consequences are bound together in conscious awareness, reflecting the general linkage through time between representations of actions and effects  (aggard et al.,  p. .  According to the causal perspective Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012;2015; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002), temporal 
binding arises from bi-directional ambiguity reduction in causal inference and time 
perception. Specifically, temporal contiguity is an important cue to causality (see 
Buehner, 2005 for an overview): all else being equal, contiguous event sequences are 
more likely to be judged as causally related than delayed ones.  It then follows from 
Bayesian logic that causally related event sequences are therefore likely to be 
contiguous in time.  Given that time perception is inherently ambiguous, causal event 
sequences are likely to be perceived as shorter than non-causal sequences.  Note that 
the causal perspective encompasses the intentional one: Intentional binding here is a 
special subset of causal binding where the cause happens to be an intentional agent. 
In the experiments reported here we always operationalised causality via a key 
press which resulted in an on-screen event and compared this to sequences between 
two on-screen events. A critical reader might therefore ask to what extent our results 
genuinely reflect processes driven by causality, or whether they may instead be due to 
intentionality, or indeed simply the presence of prior motor action? As noted in the 
Introduction, there is evidence that causality – and not intentional action – is at the root 
of temporal binding (Buehner, 2012; 2015). Furthermore, Poonian & Cunnington 
(2013) reported that self-executed action-outcome intervals and observed action-
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outcome intervals lead to comparable binding effects.  The mere observation of someone else’s causal action is thus sufficient to induce binding – it is not necessary to execute a motor action.  Furthermore, Fereday & Buehner’s  results reviewed in 
the previous section) show that prior motor action in itself (without being linked to a 
causal relation) is insufficient to induce changes in time perception:  Causality is 
necessary for binding to occur.  Given the necessity and sufficiency of causality to 
produce temporal binding, we are thus confident that the clock-slowing found in our 
experiments is indeed driven by (perceived) causality.  
To conclude, we have demonstrated that temporal causal binding is effected by a 
slower internal clock.  Further experiments are necessary to determine whether clock 
speed is indeed modulated by the same factors that modulate causal belief.  
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Footnotes 
 
1  We also calculated Just-Noticeable-Differences (JNDs) and regressed 
them over standard durations to check for conformity with scalar 
assumptions (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008).  This can be found in the online 
supplement.  
2 We used 3 standard deviations as an arbitrary rule to apply uniformly in 
all experiments. Note that no participants were removed in Experiments 3 
and 4. We attribute this to the stimuli used: In Experiments 1 and 2, the 
two intervals were delineated by separate events (two events demarked 
interval one, and a single event marked interval 2). In Experiments 3 and 
4, both intervals were delineated by two events. We initially assumed that 
the latter design would confuse participants as to which intervals 
required discriminating. We note that the increased noise in Experiments 
1 and 2 likely reflects the difficulty of the task (relative to Experiments 3 
and 4).  Importantly, we further note that our use of the stimuli in this 
manner merely adds noise – it does not affect credibility of the results; the 
same pattern of results would be expected if less noise were present.  
3 Note that Figure 2  displays the mean regression lines, whereas the 
coefficients here were derived from regressions fitted to individual 
participants. 
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